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ABSTRACT 
 
 This research study is an analysis of leadership qualities and traits that are required in 
our Intelligence Community (IC) leaders in order to reduce intelligence failures.   This work 
has involved gathering and studying extensive literature review, to include intelligence-
agency unclassified historical documents and published material written by government 
officials to support the argument that intelligence failures can be reduced by emphasizing the 
use of education, training, and experience within an intelligence leader.  A comparative 
analysis was used to illustrate the importance of these key elements through the use of 
historical case studies – the 2012 Benghazi attacks, Pearl Harbor and the Cuban Missile 
Crisis.  Analysis of these case studies led us to conclude the importance and necessity of 
ensuring our intelligence leaders receive and seek the proper education, training and 
experience in order to maximize our efforts toward maintaining our national security. 
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Our national security is protected and maintained through the combined efforts of 
Federal, state, and local government agencies.  The Intelligence Community (IC), which is 
comprised of 17 Federal Government agencies, to include the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI), forms intelligence reports from collected data and delivers 
finalized intelligence products to policymakers who ultimately make decisions pertaining to 
the security of our nation.  It is our intelligence leaders’ responsibility to ensure the 
intelligence provided to policymakers is as accurate and reliable as possible.  They are 
accountable for these reports and the impact they may have on our national security.  Failure 
to ensure accuracy in the final reports can result in an intelligence failure, or a combined 
policy-intelligence failure, and ultimately have a negative impact on our nation’s security.    
Intelligence produced by the IC is intended to comprise the basis of decisions made 
by policymakers.  Once they receive intelligence, policymakers have the freedom to use, 
discard, or cherry-pick it.  The intelligence process used by the IC to produce final 
intelligence reports is directed by policymakers.  This initial process is referred to as the 
“planning and direction” step.1  The IC continues the intelligence process by collecting data, 
processing and exploiting the data, analyzing and producing intelligence, and, lastly, 
disseminating it to policymakers.2 Ideally, policymakers give the IC initial and, in most 
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cases, general direction regarding what data to collect – and they do so before or in the very 
early stages of a national-security issue.  It would be impossible for the agencies comprising 
the IC to collect every single piece of data pertaining to a subject within a reasonable time 
frame due to the abundance of information, so they must rely on their collection-management 
skills to collect the right information, choose actionable data based on relevancy and 
accuracy, produce analyses useful to policymakers, and ensure their timely delivery.   
Without proper direction from policymakers, the IC would not collect the data necessary to 
analyze threats imposed upon our nation.  If the intelligence process lacks initial direction, 
the chances of producing inaccurate intelligence reports are greater.  Once the IC completes 
the intelligence process, the intelligence reports are then delivered to policymakers.  They 
review the reports (ideally but not always in practice), and use them (again, not always) to 
help arrive at final decisions regarding policy issues.  Decisions that lead to a mishap or 
unfavorable outcome will usually be blamed on the IC for providing policymakers with 
inaccurate or faulty intelligence, even if the intelligence produced was misinterpreted or 
cherry-picked by policymakers.  As stated by Mark M. Lowenthal in Intelligence: From 
Secrets to Policy, “There are only policy successes and intelligence failures.  There are no 
policy failures and intelligence successes.”3   
 Although our nation’s IC is, in general, highly respected and capable, there have been 
deficiencies as a result of inaccurate or faulty intelligence.  Unfortunately, since failure is 
recognized much more often than success (successes are, by definition, almost always quiet), 
intelligence failures are more evident than a successful mission informed by accurate and 
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reliable intelligence.  It is clear that government systems are not perfect and will not always 
achieve success in every mission and task presented, but it is important that our intelligence 
leaders take appropriate measures to maximize their efforts in achieving excellence and 
success in their own right and in terms of convincing policymakers to make the best use of 
available intelligence.  When considering the human factor, some degree of failure is 
inevitable, but our leaders can take the necessary steps to minimize both intelligence and 
policy failures.  Since intelligence is often the foundation and basis of the final decisions 
made by policymakers, working to reduce these failures begins with our intelligence leaders.  
They are responsible for delivering intelligence to policymakers, and their diligence will 
generally determine whether it is relevant or faulty and, even more fundamentally, used or 
ignored.  In order to deliver the best analysis of existing threats to policymakers in an attempt 
to maintain our national security, it is vital that intelligence leaders perform at their best and 
work continuously to improve their leadership and technical skills. 
Circumstances are constantly changing around the world, so it is important that our 
IC and its leaders are able effectively to adapt to such changes.  This calls for a delicate 
balance between promoting depth of analysis regarding major national-security threats, and 
agility to keep the IC ahead and emerging threats.  Among all of the senior intelligence 
officer’s jobs, this is perhaps the most important because without this proper balance, the best 
intelligence will not make it to our policymakers.  Intelligence leaders must ensure they are 
taking all the steps necessary to fulfill their duties effectively and efficiently.4  Not only do 
senior intelligence professionals have to utilize their skills to combat complex threats, they 
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  Definitions:	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  of	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  efficiency	  –	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  minimal	  amount	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time	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must also use them to keep pace with continuous technological advances.  Without the proper 
education, training, and experience among the leadership as well as the rank and file, the task 
of ensuring the relevancy and accuracy of intelligence becomes difficult to accomplish.  
Despite our many successes, our government and its officials, including our IC and its 
leaders, must continuously strive for improvement in order to maintain our national security.  
This can be achieved by inculcating three key things - education, training, and experience.    
The purpose of this study is to identify faults in our leadership system within the 
intelligence profession and determine how the IC can work toward improving key leadership 
skills and qualities to increase chances of analytical and policy success.  In order to address 
this concern, we must first define what an intelligence leader is and the role these individuals 
play in the IC.  By defining and examining intelligence leaders’ roles within the IC and 
policy efforts, we are able to analyze their significance to our national security.   
Although the qualities and traits emphasized in this study are central to improving 
leadership skills in any profession, leaders are not constrained to follow one specific 
leadership style or theory.  There are several leadership styles and theories that leaders can 
follow to be efficient and effective.  Peter G. Northouse recognizes several leadership 
practices and theories that have proven valuable in developing effective leaders.  Some of the 
specific practices and theories Northouse addresses that are applicable to intelligence leaders 
include the style approach, situational approach, and transformational leadership approach.5 
Competent leaders may combine many of these different practices and theories to help 
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  Northouse, Peter G., Leadership: Theory and Practice. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
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maximize their leadership potential.  All of them rely to a significant degree on how a leader 
values and uses education, training, and experience. 
The first leadership approach that some leaders practice is the style approach.  
According to Northouse, this approach “emphasizes the behavior of the leader.”6   Leaders 
are individuals who lead by example.  The style approach focuses on leaders’ actions rather 
than what they are capable of or their personal characteristics.7  Subordinates are able to 
determine the quality of a leader through his or her actions.  A leader’s behaviors are 
analyzed and broken down into two kinds of behavior: task and relationship.  Task behavior 
helps subordinates accomplish tasks and missions, whereas relationship behavior focuses on 
the relationships built between the leader and his or her subordinates.8  Leaders are able to 
alter and shift their behaviors based on their subordinates’ responses.  These behaviors are 
important because intelligence leaders are responsible for accomplishing the task of 
producing valid and relevant products and must build their relationships with other agencies 
to do so.  A high level of balance between these two behaviors results in effective leadership.  
Without a high balance, intelligence leaders will be less likely to produce successful results.  
One of the most common leadership styles is the situational approach.  This style, as 
implied by its name, concentrates on the situations leaders are placed in and how they handle 
them.9  Each situation is different and requires leaders to approach them individually.  
Leaders are required to adapt their skills to each situation in order to be effective and 
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properly handle the situation.  This includes analyzing their subordinates and learning their 
strengths and weaknesses so they are able to adapt their leadership style to match the level of 
competence, energy, and expertise of their various subordinates.10  A leader must address and 
examine every factor of a situation to include the situation itself and its complexity and the 
individuals assigned to attack it or accomplish the task presented.  Intelligence leaders adopt 
this style of leadership frequently due to the diversity of issues and tasks with which they are 
presented.  Depending on the factors of surrounding the issue at hand, leaders may choose to 
work with certain agencies due to possible time constraints and access to particular 
information.  In order to be successful in executing this style of leadership, they must 
exercise flexibility and properly adapt to each situation.11   
 A leadership style widely used today is the transformational approach.  This 
leadership style focuses on transforming leaders’ subordinates positively and aiming to 
develop them into leaders themselves.12  Transformational leadership involves an increase in 
motivation and morality in both the leader and the subordinate.13  Leaders become influential 
figures and encourage their subordinates to reach their full potential.  Unlike the situational 
approach, which is by definition situation-specific, this type of approach is very broad.  Its 
main focus is to improve subordinates as individuals while working together to accomplish 
the task presented.  This style of leadership is vital within the IC.  The IC’s agencies are 
ideally supposed to work together to produce the most accurate intelligence possible.  
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Transformational leadership will increase coordination and information-sharing among the 
agencies, and encourage a joint effort regarding intelligence tasks, by giving subordinate 
analysts the leadership authorities and opportunities they need to develop this crucial set of 
skills. 
Intelligence leaders who practice these different leadership approaches can become 
more effective through the proper use of education, training, and experience.  This study will 
demonstrate the need for education and present different sources of education, such as 
academic institutes, which will enhance the analytical skills of our intelligence leaders.  This 
work will also use the same approach to emphasize the significance of adequate training for 
leaders in the intelligence profession.  Training is a tool that should be utilized throughout a 
leader’s professional career.  This study will highlight various training programs and courses 
available to intelligence leaders and demonstrate its underlying correlation with education.  
The last key element, experience, is a combination of life and professional events and a direct 
reflection of a leader’s ability to apply the sources of education and training that he or she 
has received to real-world intelligence and policy problems.   
The next step in this study is to relate the importance of these key elements through 
the use of historical case studies.  These include Pearl Harbor, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and 
the 2012 Benghazi attacks.   Theses analyses will allow the researcher to emphasize positive 
and negative leadership traits, and to examine the ways in which to enhance positive traits 
and limit negative ones – and by extension negative policy outcomes - through education, 
training, and experience.  Intelligence leaders hold important positions that affect our 
national security, so it is vital that they utilize all resources to their maximum potential to 
help ensure that security.        
	  
	   8	  
 This work incorporates qualitative methods, specifically comparative methods, to 
support its key arguments.  These will identify differences among intelligence leaders and the 
ways in which they either succeeded or failed.  An analysis of Pearl Harbor and the 2012 
Benghazi attacks will provide examples of intelligence failures and allow us to identify the 
leadership traits contributing to it.  From there, it will be possible to identify and emphasize 
the leadership actions that could have helped to prevent such failures.   
 One of the most well-known intelligence failures occurred on December 7, 1941.  
Japanese carriers launched a surprise attack against the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in 
Hawaii and destroyed four battleships and 188 U.S. aircraft.  More than 2,400 Americans 
were killed and an additional 1,200 were injured.14  Our nation failed to prepare for such an 
attack from Japan as our IC and administration underestimated their capabilities and intent.  
As a result of failed intelligence, this surprise attack left our retaliatory powers crippled for 
nearly six months.  The IC (in this case its forerunners in the Navy and War Departments) is 
responsible for collecting intelligence that pertains to an adversary’s intentions and 
capabilities.  Failure properly to collect, analyze, and distribute intelligence concerning Japan 
and their objectives led to one of our nation’s most disastrous historical events that ultimately 
encouraged our nation to improve and unify intelligence efforts through better forms of 
organization and leadership within the IC.  Unfortunately, we have experienced additional 
intelligence failures since then that have exposed weak IC and political leaders, including the 
2012 Benghazi attacks. 
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  retrieved	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 On September 11, 2012, Islamic militants attacked the U.S. Mission in Benghazi, 
Libya and killed 4 Americans to include Ambassador Christopher Stevens, Foreign Service 
Information Management Officer Sean Smith, and two former Navy SEALS, Glen Doherty 
and Tyrone Woods.15  U.S. personnel in Benghazi requested heightened security from the 
Obama Administration on multiple occasions prior to the attack in response to the acts of 
terrorism around them and continuous threats against them.  The Obama Administration 
denied and/or ignored such security requests, as they did not view the requests as a high 
priority, and Islamic militants were able to ambush the U.S. Mission.16 After several 
warnings of terroristic activity from Ambassador Stevens and other U.S Personnel at the U.S. 
Mission to the Obama Administration, the administration, along with the IC, failed to take 
appropriate security measures to ensure their safety.  Although there is evidence that the IC 
did provide sufficient reports concerning the security issues and terroristic activity prior to 
the attack, intelligence leaders failed to follow through with their findings and assist the 
administration in increasing security measures for the U.S. Mission in Benghazi.17  They 
failed to fully understand the enemies’ capabilities and their intentions, which ultimately led 
to the death of four Americans.     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  “Benghazi:	  The	  Terrorist	  Attack	  of	  September	  11,	  2012	  –	  Executive	  Summary,”	  
Discoverthenetworks.org	  –	  A	  Guide	  to	  the	  Political	  Left,	  accessed	  January	  24,	  2015,	  
retrieved	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16	  U.S.	  Senate	  Select	  Committee	  on	  Intelligence,	  Review	  of	  the	  Terrorist	  Attacks	  on	  U.S.	  
Facilities	  in	  Benghazi,	  Libya,	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  11-­‐12,	  2012	  together	  with	  Additional	  Views,	  (U.S.	  
Senate	  Select	  Committee	  on	  Intelligence	  113th	  Congress,	  January	  15,	  2014),	  pg.	  17-­‐19,	  
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/benghazi2014/benghazi.pdf  
	  
17	  Ibid.,	  pg.	  13-­‐14,	  http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/benghazi2014/benghazi.pdf	  
	  
	   10	  
Despite failures such as Pearl Harbor and Benghazi, there have been many more 
intelligence-policy successes.  An in-depth analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis will allow us 
to highlight the decisions made toward its successful mission and the respective leaders 
involved.  On October 14, 1962, nuclear missiles were spotted on the island of Cuba by an 
American U-2 spy plane.18  President Kennedy and his principal advisors were informed of 
the shocking evidence during the morning of October 16, 1962, and deliberated over the 
matter to consider what actions needed to be taken.  The President and his advisors knew that 
any action chosen could possibly lead to a bigger crisis.  Eight days after the discovery of the 
nuclear missiles construction by the Soviet Union in Cuba, President Kennedy made the 
decision to address American citizens and inform them of the situation along with the 
possible outcomes that may result after action has been taken.19  President Kennedy 
addressed the public with caution by using verbiage, such as “quarantine,” to avoid triggering 
a war with the Soviet Union.20  As stated in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Library, 
“Even if events stopped a long way short of the cataclysm, there was still room for a 
thundering crisis, the outcome of which would depend in significant measure upon the way 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  “The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962:  Presenting the Photographic Evidence Abroad.” 




19	  Sherwin, Martin J.  “One Step from Nuclear War – The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50:  In 
Search of Historical Perspective.” National Archives.  Vol. 44, No. 2.  Fall 2012.    
http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2012/fall/cuban-missiles.html 
	  
20	  Ibid.,	  http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2012/fall/cuban-missiles.html	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in which our allies would respond —whether they would support us or back away.”21  A 
nuclear war was at risk, but the President needed to terminate and remove the Soviet Union’s 
construction all while attempting to avoid such a war.  The decision was made to quarantine 
Cuba from the importation of all offensive military equipment.  Kennedy’s decision to force 
Secretary General Nikita Khrushchev to remove the missiles would upset the leadership of 
the Soviet Union, but his plan of action was to successfully remove the missiles without 
generating a war.22  This case study will enable the researcher to demonstrate the importance 
of the key elements that highly, competent leaders, such as President Kennedy and his 
advisors, should possess. 
This work relies on source documents located as the result of an extensive literature 
review, including intelligence-agency unclassified historical documents and published 
material written by government officials to support the argument that intelligence failures can 
be reduced by inculcating and developing the key leadership elements addressed in this 
study.  Using these sources will also help us to identify key leadership traits essential to 
becoming a successful leader.  As with most intelligence-related subject matter, this study 
will face some limitations regarding source material.  Although the work will highlight 
several sources of training and education that combine with operational experience, there are 
documents within the IC that are considered classified material and place certain limits on the 





22	  Ibid.,	  http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2012/fall/cuban-missiles.html	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level of detail and fidelity the work can achieve.  The IC has a responsibility in its handling 
of classified documents, “to maintain the secrecy of information, needs, and methods.”23  
 By focusing on these key elements – education, training, and experience – in this 
works’ concluding chapter, we will be able to assess the characteristics that influence the 
effectiveness and efficiency of intelligence leaders. Furthermore, this study will demonstrate 
that without a strong leadership foundation optimized by these key elements, intelligence 
leaders are more likely to produce intelligence failures, which can potentially compromise 
our national security.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Lowenthal,	  Mark	  M.,	  Intelligence	  from	  Secrets	  to	  Policy.	  Washington,	  DC:	  CQ	  Press,	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CHAPTER II  
KEY INTELLIGENCE-LEADER TRAITS 
Leadership 
 Becoming a successful leader requires a substantial amount of effort and dedication to 
the position and its defined role.  In order to achieve success, leaders must explore the proper 
avenues, such as education and training, to build their experience and develop the key 
leadership traits.  In 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) 
was ratified, creating the director of national intelligence (DNI) who replaced the director of 
central intelligence (DCI) as the head of the IC.24  The DNI serves as senior intelligence 
official and as principal intelligence adviser to the president, the National Security Council 
(NSC), and the Homeland Security Council (HSC).25  This new position oversees all 
intelligence agencies, has access to all intelligence produced, and “is responsible for ensuring 
that it is disseminated as needed across the intelligence community.”26  Senior intelligence 
professionals, such as the DNI require a certain set of skills that enables them to lead 
effectively and efficiently.  Two of the most vital are the ability effectively and promptly to 
make decisions and to exercise appropriate ethical and moral standards in the process.    
 These skills are particularly important for intelligence leaders, but are also expected 
from all of those involved in the intelligence process.  Nonetheless, senior leaders are 
ultimately accountable for their subordinates and the end result of an assigned task or 
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mission.  Leaders who continuously practice these skills and work to develop them will 
increase the chances of more favorable intelligence and policy outcomes.  At the most basic 
level, the intelligence process consists of several individuals working together to create a 
final intelligence report and ensure it reaches the consumer.  As previously stated, the process 
begins with planning and direction from policymakers, leads to the collection of data by the 
IC, processing and exploitation, then analysis and production of that data, and ends with 
dissemination to policymakers.27   Assessment of the effectiveness of intelligence 
assessments within a larger operational process is an equally important part of what is in 
effect an iterative and dynamic process occurring within a nonlinear and often ethically 
challenging situation. The decisions made in this process are based on a critical analysis of 
the potential results and consequences to each respective decision.  Without critical thinking 
and the ethical-legal considerations that must accompany it, the final decisions can ultimately 
have a negative effect on our nation’s security, particularly when politics, rather than policy 
considerations, impact the process, as they often do.  Intelligence leaders must be particularly 
attuned and resistant to any kind of politicization.    
 It is essential intelligence leaders and policymakers maintain a strong relationship in 
order for the IC to produce the most accurate and relevant intelligence reports.  Intelligence 
leaders have to ensure the policymakers’ needs and requirements are met or they are in 
danger of wasting valuable time and imposing a bigger risk upon our national security.  The 
IC is responsible for understanding their customers’ needs and what they are working to 
accomplish.  As Thomas Fingers states, “…the information provided by the Intelligence 
Community should be immediately helpful to policymakers because it is tailored to meet 
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their needs by people who have an insider’s understanding of what those needs are.”28  The 
information collected by the IC is not determined valuable by its quantity, but rather by its 
quality.  The information is considered pertinent if it meets the customer’s needs and 
requirements and then translated in an intelligence report for their use.   Policymakers need 
intelligence reports to support and guide their decisions.  The IC serves as a support function 
and is required to ensure the policymakers receive reports that reflect their needs in a timely 
manner.29  
 Members of the IC, including intelligence leaders such as the DNI, are required to 
possess excellent decision-making skills due to the complex and difficult challenges they 
encounter every day.  Although policymakers direct the intelligence process, the IC is 
responsible for collecting and sorting through an abundance of information pertaining to a 
particular subject matter and/or threat and making the most effective and efficient decisions 
regarding how to collect on it, develop useful analyses, and deliver them to decision makers.   
They are required to decipher what information is relevant and what sources are credible.  As 
Amanda J. Gookins states in The Role of Intelligence in Policy Making, “In order to provide 
timely reports, intelligence professionals collect, analyze, and synthesize relevant 
information from various resources, seeking the most current data possible.”30  These reports 
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must adhere to the policymakers’ demands to include preference of delivery.  Circumstances 
around the world are continuously changing, which in turn results in constant data change.  
This forces the IC to make decisions in a timely manner so that all intelligence provided to 
policymakers is relevant and accurate.  The time constraints on the IC limit its collections 
sources and elevate the sense of urgency to relay proper intelligence to policymakers and 
military leaders in time to make a difference in the policy arena.   Timeliness is equally as 
important as providing accurate and relevant data.  If intelligence reports are not provided 
promptly, they can become irrelevant as a result of evolving data.   
 While dealing with time constraints, IC members have to attempt to remain objective 
while selecting the information they feel is relevant to the presented situation or threat.  In 
general, humans have biases, opinions, and heuristics (rules of thumb) they apply to certain 
subject matter often subconsciously, based on their prior experiences and/or knowledge.31  
Christina Shelton refers to this as “scotoma.”32  She defines scotoma as “an individual who 
fails to see facts, or is blind to alternatives, observes only limited possibilities as a result of a 
sensory locking out of information from the environment.”33   IC members and leaders may 
gravitate toward data that favors their prior notions without realizing that their intentions 
derive from bias or epistemologies.  According to Gookins, “When new, unrelated 
information is encountered, the mind may subconsciously discard or misinterpret either the 
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event or the significance of the event.”34   Crucial information that can have a detrimental 
impact on our national security can be overlooked if analysts or their bosses subconsciously 
discard or misinterpret information.  This is why it is extremely important that the IC 
effectively respond to the changing circumstances around the world.  Vision, agility, and 
creativity are therefore critically important for leaders as well as collectors and analysts.  
They must always be open and alert to new information and use their analytical and critical-
thinking skills to decide if the information is relevant to our national security and how it will 
impact it, and from there determine how to get the information to policymakers and make 
sure it “adheres,” as the IC refers to reports that are both useful and used.   
It is equally vital that intelligence leaders and their subordinates avoid interpersonal 
conflicts and interagency infighting as they make their decisions and consider all potential 
threats and sources of information.  Given the realities of large bureaucracies, and especially 
highly political ones, this is a tall but not hopeless order. Usually, personal events, 
experience, and cultural factors influence how one interprets information.35  Gookins notes 
that, “Intelligence failures are often attributed to assumptions and estimates based on biases 
of the intelligence professional or how intelligence is understood and used on the 
policymaker’s side.”36  This statement reiterates the importance of understanding the 
customer and their needs.  Failures are more likely to occur when biases are involved, when 
intelligence is misunderstood by policymakers, and/or does not meet the policymakers’ 
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requirements.  Biases, along with failing to understand the customer, should be avoided 
throughout the intelligence cycle and during the policy decision-making process.  By doing 
so, the IC leadership is able to establish its credibility with policymakers and help them 
understand and diffuse complex situations.  This, in turn, often helps them to avoid the 
political entanglements that have ensnared some senior IC officials in recent years.37   
An example that has become a main topic when referring to politicization among 
policymakers and the IC is the events leading up to the Iraq invasion in 2003.  After the 
tragedy of 9/11, the emotional state of our nation was rattled and was used to influence the 
decisions toward the Iraq invasion.  There are many different “excuses” as to why we 
invaded Iraq that range from blaming the IC for faulty intelligence that led to the assumption 
of present Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) in Iraq to seeking revenge against Saddam 
Hussein for the 9/11 tragedy and for a prior rivalry between Hussein and President George 
W. Bush’s father, President George H. W. Bush.38  The public believes that we invaded Iraq 
to disarm Iraq’s WMDs and reform the Iraqi Government.  For those who have showed more 
interest in the issue rather than relying on the “facts” of the media, the presence of 
politicization is evident. 
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Intelligence leaders are responsible for ensuring they produce unbiased intelligence to 
meet the informational requirements of policymakers, but they are unable to control how that 
intelligence is used once it is in the customers’ hands.  The decisions made toward the Iraq 
invasion were based on intelligence products that were “cherry-picked” by policymakers to 
support their preconceived notions.  As Paul Pillar, an intelligence officer who worked for 
the CIA, the National Intelligence Council (NIC), and the ODNI, states, “…official 
intelligence was not relied on in making even the most significant national security decisions, 
that intelligence was misused publicly to justify decisions already made, that damaging ill 
will developed between policymakers and intelligence officers, and that the intelligence 
community’s own work was politicized,”39  Policymakers were adamant about what 
information they needed to gain the support of the American people toward their decision of 
invading Iraq.  Their inflexible and highly demanding approach ultimately had an impact on 
the way intelligence officers began to think about Iraq.40  Intelligence produced by the IC that 
did not pertain to WMDs in Iraq was ignored and information that gave any indication of 
WMDs was trumpeted and magnified.  Intelligence officers were pushed to produce 
particular material and hammered by policymakers until that material was produced.41  The 
work produced by the IC was politicized through careful and low-key intimidation and 
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occasional bullying. IC analysts questioned their own work to ensure it met the 
policymakers’ particular needs – in this case, identifying the possibility of WMDs in Iraq. 
As previously addressed, intelligence leaders are faced with tasks that require 
effective and efficient decision-making skills.  Simply having the ability to make a decision 
does not qualify as a leadership skill.  Competent leaders are those who are able to make 
these types of decisions while adhering to high ethical and moral standards.  Personal ethical 
standards and/or morals can influence a decision dramatically.  Peter G. Northouse states, 
“The choices that leaders make and how they respond in a given circumstance are informed 
and directed by their ethics.”42  Intelligence leaders with high ethical and moral standards are 
able to consider risks and consequences of a decision and make the most effective decisions.   
 Professor Martin L. Cook at the US Army War College recognizes various levels of 
moral development through a scale designed by Lawrence Kohlberg, commonly known as 
“Kohlberg’s Scale.”43 Kohlberg’s Scale is divided into three (3) levels with two (2) sublevels 
for each level.  Each level represents a phase in human maturity as the levels escalate.  The 
levels are categorized as “Pre-Conventional,” “Conventional,” and “Post-Conventional.”44  
The “Pre-Conventional” level consists of children and socially challenged adults.  These 
individuals’ mindsets are focused on their own self-interests and how certain choices can 
benefit themselves.45  According to Professor Cook, most individuals function at the 
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“Conventional” level.  The conventional thinker lacks the ability to “’think outside of’ the 
moral assumptions of the group or society around [him or] her.”46  Their decisions usually 
reflect the cultural norms and values of the society around them.  They make decisions based 
on society’s values and accept them as the appropriate standards of behavior.  The “Post-
Conventional” level is the most advanced stage of moral thinking.  At this level, individuals 
are able to “think about moral issues outside the framework of society’s values and 
assumptions.”47  They do not accept what society conforms to as being “correct.”  They are 
able to think beyond society’s values and differentiate between “right” and “wrong.”  
Leaders are expected to perform at this higher level of moral thinking.  They are placed in 
situations that challenge this level of thinking on a daily basis.  For example, they may advise 
policymakers to eliminate a certain adversary in order to ensure the safety and protection of 
every citizen in our country.  Although killing is considered morally wrong in our society 
without proper and compelling justification, our leaders’ higher level of moral thinking 
allows them to place their country’s interest at a higher priority than their own personal 
interests.  As Johnson notes, “…the world of official intelligence involves activities in many 
grey areas of moral thought, and generates perplexing dilemmas where agents must balance 
the national interest in security, which they are bound to protect, against some other virtue 
like the ancient rules against lying, stealing, killing and so forth.”48  Those who think at the 
“Conventional” level allow political agendas and interpersonal conflicts to interfere with 
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their decisions.  Effective leaders do not allow such selfish motives to affect their decision-
making process, even under political pressure.   In fact, truly ethical leaders will resign when 
they see major improprieties that do not stop even after they have voiced their objections.  
These kinds of leaders are rare, but we need more of them in the IC and elsewhere. They 
make an effort to consider the potential outcomes and consequences rather than making an 
impulse decision or a decision based on society’s values or a politician’s preferences and 
pressure.  The latter is, of course, particularly challenging since increasing numbers of senior 
intelligence leaders are political appointees. 
 Intelligence leaders must think at the “Post-Conventional” level in order to provide 
the best analysis of relevant information to policymakers for their final decisions.  Without 
the ability to think at a high moral level, their decisions can result in poor quality of 
intelligence and cause harm to our national security.  Exercising high ethical and moral 
standards also plays a vital role in leadership accountability.  Respectable, ethical leaders 
take responsibility and are accountable for every decision they make and those made by their 
subordinates, whether the outcome is good or bad.49  Retired General Stephen R. Lorenz 
emphasizes the accountability of senior leaders, such as intelligence leaders by stating, “We 
are still accountable for our own choices and that of our people, but we are also accountable 
for outcomes.”50  This statement highlights and reiterates the importance of the decision-
making process.  Senior leaders are accountable for decisions made not only by themselves, 
but also by their subordinates.  Accountability also builds trust among subordinates and the 
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American people.  Leaders who are accountable for their actions and of those actions made 
by their subordinates take corrective action when a decision results in an unfavorable 
outcome.  Obviously, with a favorable outcome, accountability is praised and acknowledged 
to an even greater degree.  Those leaders in our Federal Government who take the initiative 
to correct an unfavorable outcome or an unethical problem show their subordinates and the 
American people that they care enough to acknowledge mistakes and abuses of power, and to 
take the appropriate actions to correct them.  
 Accountability is a reflection of an effective leader.  Unfortunately, not all of those 
appointed and selected as leaders exercise the same responsibilities as others and can fall 
prey to a need to please the public and the media.  On July 3, 1988, Captain Will Rogers 
commanded the USS Vincennes in the Persian Gulf to protect neutral shipping.51  While 
attempting to protect this shipping from spillover effects of the ongoing war between Iran 
and Iraq, Captain Rogers ordered his subordinates to shoot down a plane that was headed 
towards the USS Vincennes, which he believed to be an Iranian F-14 ready to attack.52  After 
ordering the shoot down, Captain Rogers and the rest of the crew discovered that what was 
originally thought to be an Iranian F-14 was actually an Iranian commercial airliner flight 
carrying 290 passengers plus their crew.  All passengers and crew on the flight were killed.53  
 The Iranian commercial airliner flight had left Bandar Abbas seven (7) minutes 
before the USS Vincennes shot it down.  Therefore, the Captain of the aircraft was 
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monitoring the control frequencies and air traffic control at Tehran Center while the USS 
Vincennes was broadcasting its warning messages on military and international air distress 
frequencies.54  Although there was a transmission made by the frigate USS Sides that made it 
evident the message was directed at the Iranian commercial airline, its “transponder, which is 
equivalent to the military’s ‘identification friend or foe’ (IFF) electronics, was broadcasting 
the unique code of a commercial airliner.”55   Captain Rogers authorized firing antiaircraft 
missiles when the Iranian commercial airliner was 11 miles away.  It was learned minutes 
after shooting down the aircraft that the USS Sides’ combat information center correctly 
identified the aircraft’s code as a commercial airliner at the exact moment the USS Vincennes 
fired its missiles.   
Captain Rogers’ aggressiveness hastened his decision and led to the death of innocent 
passengers en route to Dubai.  A difference of seconds could have saved these individuals’ 
lives.  Captain Rogers’ hurried and aggressive attitude interfered with his ability to make a 
sound decision.  Although he felt he made the best decision, he did not hold himself 
accountable for the outcome of his actions, nor did the U.S. Navy.  Instead, the U.S. Navy 
and Captain Rogers made excuses and lies to justify the killings of the 290 passengers abroad 
the Iranian commercial aircraft.56  The intelligence was available, yet Captain Rogers chose 
to rush his decision, which affected the lives of several people, but also affected his abilities 
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as a leader.  If there was any doubt that Captain Rogers did not make the best decision 
considering the circumstances, the U.S. Navy would not have made excuses and told lies. 
The truth would have been enough to justify his decision.  That was obviously not the case.  
The truth revealed poor decision-making skills and also revealed the lack of accountability 
among the U.S. Navy leaders.  Had Captain Rogers held fire until he had the crucial 
intelligence he needed – intelligence he knew would be on the way from the various ships’ 
CICs along with intelligence already received that the aircraft has not locked radar onto any 
American ships – he would have averted disaster.    
Education 
 In any profession, aspiring leaders must continue their education to develop 
knowledge and enhance their skills for their position.  Leaders are required to further their 
education in areas and matters they are ultimately responsible for, despite any lack of 
expertise, in an attempt to develop their profession.  Intelligence leaders must be 
knowledgeable in all areas of the intelligence cycle and related processes, to include levels of 
threats and high-risk situations.  They are required to understand the operational functions 
and implications of the intelligence process and enhance the skills needed to analyze new and 
existing threats to our national security.  Bridging the gap between concepts and practice, and 
bringing them together into a useful whole, is particularly important in the intelligence 
profession.  This is the leadership’s responsibility.   
 There are various programs available to intelligence leaders to continue their 
professional development and further their leadership skills as intelligence professionals.  
One educational source available to intelligence professionals is the academic expertise 
offered at the National Intelligence University (NIU).  NIU was founded in 1962 and is based 
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in Washington, D.C. inside the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Headquarters at the Joint 
Base Anacostia Bolling (JBAB).57  This academic institution offers three degrees in the 
intelligence field: a Bachelor of Science in Intelligence, a Master of Science of Strategic 
Intelligence, and a Master of Science and Technology Intelligence.58  According to NIU, 
their mission states:  “Through dynamic teaching and learning, original research, and 
worldwide engagement, the NIU offers relevant, accessible, and career-long intelligence 
education that provides members of the intelligence and national security communities with 
knowledge, analytical skills, and a strategic awareness of the critical role intelligence plays in 
the security of the nation.”59  The NIU mission is to shape intelligence professionals into 
competent leaders to maximize efforts to protect and improve our national security.  NIU 
offers courses that prepare and educate intelligence leaders on how to handle current and 
future challenges involving our national security.  In order successfully to accomplish this 
mission, NIU has established strategic goals to be achieved upon each student’s degree 
completion: 
1. “Develop strategic leaders capable of objectivity and critical thinking, in an 
academic environment that fosters a comprehensive understanding of the IC.”60  
2. “Produce and publish value-added research that develops analytical and creative 
thinking skills, contributes to the intelligence mission, and sparks innovation.”61  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	   “Locations,” National Intelligence University, accessed October 8, 2014 http://ni-
u.edu/wp/about-niu/locations/  
	  
58	  “About NIU,” National Intelligence University, accessed October 8, 2014, http://ni-
u.edu/wp/about-niu/  
	  
59	  Ibid.	  http://ni-u.edu/wp/about-niu/	  
	  
60	  Ibid.	  http://ni-u.edu/wp/about-niu/	  
	  
	   27	  
3. “Serve as an academic catalyst for national and international IC engagement.”62  
4. “Enhance the integration of the IC through personal and professional relationships 
established in university programs.”63  
If each is accomplished, these strategic goals can help members of the IC become proficient 
leaders.    
 The NIU is a well-known institution that focuses specifically on the intelligence 
profession, but there are other programs offered that are also directed toward the IC and their 
functionality.  These include courses offered through The Armed Forces Communications 
and Electronics Association (AFCEA).64  This association offers a variety of intelligence 
courses to professionals to increase their understanding of the IC and its function.  Some of 
these courses have the privilege of being taught by Dr. Mark M. Lowenthal, who is an 
internationally recognized expert on intelligence and a retired senior CIA leader.65  His 
courses provide an overview of the IC’s operational functions and current challenges for 
government, military, academic, and contractor professionals who continuously interact with 
the IC.66   
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 In recent news, NIU has worked with the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and 
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity to create the NIU Quantico Academic Center.67 
Concerning its focus, NIU President Dr. David Ellison states that the academic center 
“supports the Director of National Intelligence guidance to make intelligence education, 
research, and outreach opportunities accessible to the entire intelligence community, and to 
operate within the larger context of improving intelligence integration.”68  
 Another institution that can enhance intelligence leaders’ skills and help develop their 
knowledge of our national security is The Institute of World Politics (IWP).  This institute is 
not aimed toward intelligence professionals specifically, but focuses on statecraft, national 
security, and international affairs.69  As their mission states, “The Institute of World Politics 
is a graduate school of national security and international affairs, dedicated to developing 
leaders with a sound understanding of international realties and the ethical conduct of 
statecraft, based on knowledge and appreciation of the founding principles of the American 
political economy and the Western moral tradition.”70  
Although the IWP does not focus academics solely on intelligence professionals, it has 
educational agreements and relationships with a number of IC agencies.  Due to the 
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sensitivity of intelligence, these agreements and relationships are not discussed in public 
materials.71   
Efforts to integrate the various agencies within the IC have resulted in recurring 
problems and have sometimes had a negative effect on the operational functions of the 
intelligence process.   Intelligence agencies have been found to be reluctant to share 
information with each other for various reasons.  This issue was addressed in the 2004 reform 
legislation with the creation of the DNI.  The DNI is “to have access to all intelligence and is 
responsible for ensuring that it is disseminated as needed across the intelligence 
community.”72  Although the DNI was created to help eliminate this issue, agencies within 
the IC continue to have trouble in this area.  Their collaboration efforts can be affected by the 
number of agencies within the IC and/or “ownership” of their respective product.  
Implementing the key elements of this intelligence-integration into educational curricula and 
operational tools for the IC is vitally important.  If the IC agencies work harder at combining 
their efforts, and educating one another about how best to do so, our intelligence needs can 
be met more effectively and efficiently. 
Training 
 There are many training programs offered to professionals responsible for protecting 
our national security, to include intelligence leaders and the IC.  Although it is not feasible to 
address the countless available programs and courses, there are several offered through 
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government agencies that can enhance the skills of intelligence leaders and help them 
become better at their jobs.   
One government agency that offers leadership training to government officials is the 
Office of Personnel Management (OPM).  “The OPM provides human resources, leadership, 
and support to Federal agencies and helps the Federal workforce achieve their aspirations as 
they serve the American people,” according to the OPM website.73  They have developed 
leadership tools that are based on leadership assessment experience and primarily focus on 
improving leadership within the Federal Government.  The tools developed by the OPM are 
used to improve leadership qualities within an established leader, assist agencies with 
identifying leaders and those who present leadership potential, and help transition new 
leaders into their new roles.74  The OPM offers two particular training programs aimed at 
developing leaders.  The first is the Federal Leadership Development Programs (FedLDP).  
The trainee is able to select a leadership development program by agency, pay level, and/or 
targeted audience scope.  For example, intelligence leaders would engage in training 
programs under the Department of Defense/Defense Intelligence Agency (DOD/DIA).75   
One particular training program under the DOD/DIA is the Joint Military Intelligence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  “Our Mission, Role & History,” U.S. Office of Personnel Management, accessed October 
8, 2014 http://www.opm.gov/about-us/our-mission-role-history/what-we-do/ 
	  
74	  “Federal Leadership Development Programs,” U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 






	   31	  
Training Center (JMITC).76  JMITC offers training to intelligence professionals on the 
“evolving core intelligence tradecraft learning requirements of DIA and other Department of 
Defense, Intelligence Community, and Allied Intelligence professionals.”77  This course 
ultimately trains its students to adapt to the demands of the intelligence agencies and 
professionals during given situations.78  
The second training opportunity offered by the OPM is its Center for Leadership 
Development.  This training program works with high-performing leaders, supervisors, 
managers, and executives to enhance their leadership and management skills.79  For those 
leaders who strive to be more competent and continuously aspire to improve their skills, the 
OPM offers custom leadership development and training courses to fit their specific needs.80  
They offer programs for all levels of federal careers, to include management and team 
development courses and collaborative leadership courses that are primarily built on the 
Executive Core Qualifications set out by the OPM.  These qualifications include: leading 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  “Joint Military Intelligence Training Center (JMITC),” Defense Intelligence Agency, 
accessed October 8, 2014 
http://www.dia.mil/Training/JointMilitaryIntelligenceTrainingCenter(JMITC.aspx  
	  
77	  Ibid.	  http://www.dia.mil/Training/JointMilitaryIntelligenceTrainingCenter(JMITC.aspx	  
	  
78	  Ibid.	  http://www.dia.mil/Training/JointMilitaryIntelligenceTrainingCenter(JMITC.aspx	  
 
79“About Us,” Center for Leadership Development, accessed October 8, 2014  
http://cldcentral.usalearning.net/mod/page/view.php?id=234 
	  
80	  “Custom Leadership Development and Training Solutions,” Center for Leadership 
Development, accessed October 8, 2014 
http://cldcentral.usalearning.net/mod/page/view.php?id=257   
	  
	   32	  
change, leading people, results driven, business acumen, and building coalitions.81  The OPM 
recognizes the importance of quality leadership and works to emphasize these core 
qualifications by providing career-long education and training. 
There are several training programs/courses available not only to improve the 
intelligence process for intelligence leaders, but to also improve specific leadership skills.  
As previously mentioned, leaders are expected to exercise high ethical and moral standards. 
Therefore they must strive to improve by engaging in exercises and practices that will help 
them further their ethical and moral development.   
The Office of the DNI has addressed certain principles that IC professionals are 
responsible for maintaining regardless of their title or position.  According to the ODNI, 
these principles “reflect the standard of ethical conduct expected of all Intelligence 
Community personnel, regardless of individual role or agency affiliation.”82  These principles 
include their mission, truth, lawfulness, integrity, stewardship, excellence, and diversity.  It is 
the individuals’ responsibility to ensure their conduct is in accordance with these principles.  
The ODNI has assigned the Designated Agency Ethics Official (DAEO), who is also the 
General Counsel, a leadership oversight position to ensure that members of the IC exercise 
those principles.83  
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In order to ensure that these principles are practiced, there are many ethics-training 
courses available not only to intelligence leaders, but also to other leaders in our federal 
government.  In particular, the United States Office of Government Ethics (OGE) was 
created to “Provide overall leadership and oversight of the executive branch ethics program 
designed to prevent and resolve conflicts of interest.”84  The OGE works with over 5,000 
ethics officials to implement the program in over 130 agencies.85  The OGE is responsible for 
implementing and advising government officials of ethical laws and policies.  They are also 
responsible for holding those officials accountable for carrying out the material learned and 
properly applying it.  They are not responsible for any ethical violations and direct those 
issues to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG).86   
Although these training courses are a small portion of all the ethics training 
opportunities available to intelligence leaders, the DoD has also provided a list of online 
resources available for Federal and Non-Federal Government employees to engage in 
additional ethical training opportunities.87  Leaders must strive continuously to be highly 
ethical and moral, to follow the law, and to foster these traits in their subordinates.  
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Intelligence leaders have resources available to improve these qualities, and it is incumbent 
upon them to utilize them.       
Since the intelligence arena involves the use and handling of classified material, it is 
vital that intelligence leaders ensure they and their subordinates are properly trained to 
handle such material.  In 2013, DNI James Clapper signed a Directive addressing the 
implementation and oversight of the IC classification management and control markings 
system.88  Under the new Directive, those who are granted access to classified information 
are required to attend training to ensure their complete understanding of the classification and 
control markings system pursuant to EO 13526.89   Misuse or mishandling of classified 
material can result in a breach of our national security and jeopardize the lives of American 
citizens.  Along with the educational expertise provided at the NIU, it is the only institution 
that offers research in the Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmentalized Information (TS/SCI) 
arena.90  Due to the sensitivity of this classified material and the potential effects that its 
compromise may have on our national security, policy should be clear and consistent.  To 
clarify security policy and place higher restrictions on it, the DoD established the Defense 
Security Enterprise (DSE) “to protect DoD personnel, information, operations, resources, 
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technologies, and facilities.”91  The DSE has defined three goals to manage security 
improvements: 
1. Standardize security functions across DoD to achieve synergistic execution and 
enhance operations.92  
2. Allocate security resources to demonstrate a return on investment.93  
3. Improve individual performance to develop a cadre of highly skilled security 
professionals.94  
The success in reaching these goals is highly dependent on the professionals working 
toward them, and in particular on the quality of training they receive. The DoD’s Defense 
Security Service (DSS) has established The Center for Development of Security Excellence 
(CDSE) in order to provide security education, training, and certification products and 
services to those professionals responsible for the protection of our national security, to 
include intelligence leaders.95  The CDSE “provides development, delivery, and exchange of 
security knowledge to ensure a high-performing workforce capable of addressing our 
Nation’s security challenges.”96  
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The National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX; also known as the Director of 
National Counterintelligence) also offers a course “intended to train IC element personnel, 
providing a complete and common understanding of the classification and control markings 
system (as directed by the Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 710)” called The 
Classification Management and the IC Markings System.97  The IC, its leaders, and other 
personnel authorized to handle classified material are responsible for safeguarding the 
information in accordance with national policy to ensure it is secure against unauthorized 
disclosure.  By understanding the customer, as intelligence leaders and the IC should, 
intelligence leaders are able to ensure the reports produced are in safe hands and can 
minimize the risk of leaks.  The risk becomes greater when intelligence reports are delivered 
to agencies and/or individuals who either have little use for the information produced or 
minimized involvement in the situation at hand.  Our adversaries long for inconsistency 
and/or some sort of mishap on our end in order to gain easy access to classified material.  
Proper and consistent training for all authorized personnel will help reduce the possibilities 
for any inconsistency and breach of material. 
Our nation’s fragile security structure can potentially be compromised by the 
mishandling of a secure document at the hands of an inexperienced intelligence official or, 
worse, as a result of insider or external espionage.   Because so many of these documents are 
now online, and not always on Intelink or other self-contained intelligence systems, the 
number of security compromises continues to increase.  The importance of proper handling 
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and management of secure documents cannot be stressed enough.  If intelligence leaders or 
their subordinates have questions about a document’s classification, it is their responsibility 
to seek appropriate guidance and training to properly educate/train themselves in the 
handling of these types of documents. 
Experience 
 An intelligence leader can receive all of the education and training available to him, 
but he will not be as effective in his duties as one who has accumulated valuable professional 
experience.  There is no substitute for professional experience.  It helps an individual develop 
maturity, character, and intuition – all critically important qualities for intelligence senior 
leaders.  Experience is one of the most essential attributes of a leader, especially when 
understanding and meeting their customers’ needs.  Leaders with extensive experience can 
better attest what information is needed to satisfy the customers’ requirements and how to 
satisfy them.  Experience is also a direct reflection of a leader’s ability effectively to apply 
the relevant sources of education and training.  Through relevant experience, our intelligence 
leaders are able to contribute their insights toward the development of effective education 
and training and can themselves relate education and training insights to their real-world 
experiences in order to develop deeper understanding and superior habits of mind.  Education 
and training are elements used to achieve a favorable outcome to increase the quality of 
experience for a leader, or to help them learn from and avoid repeating various unfavorable 
outcomes.   A favorable outcome can be described as successfully completing a task or 
achieving the goals presented within an agency.  For example, as previously stated, a major 
goal within the IC right now is intelligence integration.  The ODNI’s mission is to “Lead 
Intelligence Integration and Forge an Intelligence Community that delivers the most 
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insightful intelligence possible.”98  The leadership of a given IC agency is not and will not 
ever be expert in the workings of every agency within the IC.  They would have to know the 
ins and outs of 17 different agencies, which would be virtually impossible.  In order to 
enhance and strengthen their experiences to serve as better leaders, they must focus on the 
fluid integration of each agency within the IC.  Their vision should be to coordinate the 
efforts of all IC agencies into a synchronized machine to handle a broad range of threats.  
Intelligence leaders should have direct relationships with every agency to properly unify their 
efforts.  Although agencies may view this unified approach as an attempt to hinder their 
individual abilities to make decisions in their best interests, it is more an attempt to enhance 
the efficiencies of the IC.  In order successfully to achieve intelligence integration, there must 
be an increase of morale and understanding for the integration.  The chances for success are 
greater for the IC and its leaders if all agencies combine their efforts to combat and diffuse 
external and internal threats.  
 The DNI has challenged intelligence leaders to translate the vision of integrating 
intelligence agencies’ capabilities into a reality in which information-sharing and other forms 
of close coordination are the norm.99 The vision states, “Our leaders will need to transcend 
the traditional independent, agency-centric orientation, and move toward a leadership style 
based on cross-agency collaboration and interdisciplinary experience.”100 This will challenge 
intelligence leaders to build coalitions across agencies and their various cultures to unify 
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their efforts in achieving mission objectives.101  Intelligence leaders can become more 
effective with a successful integration, which leads to a more worthwhile and benefitting 
experience as a leader.  Although integrating agencies within the IC will not be an easy task 
considering the recurring problems that have surfaced in response to its multiple attempts, 
leadership successes will be more frequent and pronounced if this vision of integration is 
translated into a reality. 
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CHAPTER III 
CASE STUDIES 
2012 Benghazi Attack 
 On September 11, 2012, 11 years after our nation experienced terrorist attacks, U.S. 
Ambassador Christopher Stevens, Foreign Service Information Officer Sean Smith, and two 
former Navy SEALS, Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods were killed by Islamic militants who 
attacked the U.S. Mission in Benghazi, Libya.  The attack began around 9:40 pm when 
dozens of armed men approached the U.S. Mission.  The front gate was bombarded and the 
Islamic militants began setting fire to the mission, to include the Villa C, where Ambassador 
Stevens and Officer Sean Smith were located.102   The heavy smoke forced those occupying 
the Villa C to escape from the building despite repeated gunfire, but was unsuccessful as they 
lost the Ambassador amidst the smoke and failed to locate him after repeated searches.103  
Several security officers were notified of the incident, to include the Benghazi CIA 
security team and the State Department Regional Security Officer (RSO) in Tripoli, and 
prepared to defend themselves against Islamic militants in search of Ambassador Stevens and 
in an attempt to save other personnel.104   The RSO in Tripoli notified the CIA’s security 
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team in Tripoli and made the decision to form the “Tripoli Team” that consisted of CIA 
security and U.S. military officers (five CIA and two U.S. military), to include Navy SEALS 
Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods.105   While their mission was to locate Ambassador 
Stevens, the Tripoli Team experienced several delays that complicated this mission.  After 
they were notified that Ambassador’s Stevens’ body was identified at the hospital, the Chief 
of Station in Tripoli ordered the team to resume their original task of collecting non-security 
personnel and evacuating them from the Benghazi Annex to the airport for transportation to 
Tripoli.106  
Once they arrived at the Annex, the Tripoli Team split up to locate and evacuate 
personnel as instructed.  Glen Doherty climbed up to the roof of the main building to assist 
Tyrone Woods with security.107  Shortly after, the Annex was attacked by terrorists that 
included small fires and five mortar rounds.  Four out of the five mortars were direct hits and 
took the lives of Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods.108  After the attack, the security team 
leaders asked for approval to evacuate the Annex since it was determined they could not 
secure the Annex and lacked the appropriate weapons.  Their approval was granted and 
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security leaders led all U.S. personnel, including all four dead Americans, to the Benghazi 
airport to arrive in Tripoli.109  
The lives of Ambassador Stevens, Officer Smith, and Navy SEALS Doherty and 
Woods could have been saved had proper security measures been taken.   Several requests 
were sent for heightened security and leaders failed to take the appropriate measures to 
ensure the safety of these Americans.  Policymakers became lazy and failed to act with a 
sense of urgency.  An unclassified report completed by the Accountability Review Board 
(ARB) for the Benghazi attacks addresses these leadership failures.  It states, 
“Communication, cooperation, and coordination among Washington, Tripoli, and Benghazi 
functioned collegially at the working-level but were constrained by a lack of transparency, 
responsiveness, and leadership at the senior levels.”110  
Months prior to the attack, there were two other attacks against the U.S. Mission, on 
April 6 and June 6, 2012, which caused Ambassador Stevens to request additional security.111 
The Ambassador made several requests and recommendations to the State Department after 
these attacks that were never fulfilled or responded to.  The U.S. Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence’s Review of the September 11, 2012 attacks identifies several of these requests 
and sufficient evidence that displays the lack of effort on behalf of the State Department.   
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A few “excuses” the review addresses for lack of security includes a possible 
confusion of who was ultimately responsible to make the security related decisions and how 
the U.S. Mission was a temporary facility and there was uncertainty concerning the future of 
the Mission.112  The review mentions how the State Department claims they made physical 
security improvements to the Mission, but the classified ARB report states otherwise.  The 
ARB report found that the Mission compound “included a weak and very extended 
perimeter, and incomplete interior fence, no mantraps and unhardened entry gates and doors.  
Benghazi was also severely under-resourced with regard to weapons, ammunition, [non-
lethal deterrents] and fire safety equipment, including escape masks.”113  Ultimately, there 
was more security at the Annex than at the Mission.  Reports state that there were additional 
surveillance cameras installed at the Mission, but the ARB reports that they were non-
functional, including the main gate camera on the day of the attacks, because the State 
Department failed to send out a technician team to properly install them.114  
 Failure to administer proper security measures reflected a lack of leadership on behalf 
of policymakers and the IC.  Although there is evidence of intelligence reports, none of the 
reports presented to policymakers contain “tactical warning” of the specific attacks.115  There 
are reports that indicate such information concerning the attacks was received by a 
Transitional National Council (TNC) security officer in Benghazi, but he was unable to 
deliver the information efficiently to the Libyan Intelligence Service (LIS) because the only 
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contacts he had were out of the country.116  This information, of course, did not reach the IC 
until after the attacks.  Even if there was not specific intelligence addressing this specific 
attacks and a step-by-step outline of what was going to happen prior to the attacks, that does 
not mean the extremist groups were not capable of them.   
The IC is not only responsible for collecting reliable intelligence that gives hard facts 
of a specific issue, but is also responsible for understanding our enemies and their 
capabilities and translating those to policymakers.  The problem is when such capabilities are 
identified, but nothing is done about it.  The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s 
Review of the September 11, 2012 attacks states the IC was familiar with the Islamic 
extremist groups’ capabilities.  It states, “…intelligence reports made clear that extremist 
groups in eastern Libya, including Ansar al-Sharia, were not only running training camps 
there, but also plotting and carrying out attacks against U.S. and Western interests in the 
months prior to the attacks in Benghazi.”117  If the IC was aware of the potentiality of 
terroristic attacks against U.S. interests, then why did we fail to take the appropriate 
measures in preventing and preparing to combat those attacks?  Was this information not 
“enough” intelligence for intelligence leaders to bring this issue to policymakers’ attention?  
Since the intelligence did not specify an exact date for an attack, was it not “red-flag” 
material?   
For intelligence leaders, all intelligence that identifies a potential threat upon U.S. 
interests should be a “red-flag.”  Leaders who have the proper education, training, and 
experience take immediate action to ensure proper measures are taken to combat any 
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potential threats that may occur.  The IC did, in fact, take immediate action, but in the 
aftermath of the attack.  A statement made by the Director of Public Affairs for ODNI, 
Shawn Turner states the IC initially believed the attack to be spontaneous.  After further 
analysis, new information indicated that it was planned and an organized terrorist attack.118 
Was this intelligence available before the attacks?  Could this information that ultimately led 
the IC to confirm this was a terrorist attack been overlooked?  Intelligence collection is the 
most important step in the intelligence process.  If there is not collected information on a 
specific matter, then there is basically no knowledge of that specific matter.   
Intelligence leaders have the responsibility of ensuring they utilize all resources 
available to them to collect the most relevant and accurate intelligence, especially since 
technology is advancing and developing so rapidly around the world, to include social media 
sources. There is blame that not enough intelligence was collected to detect tactical warning 
of the attacks.  According to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s Review of 
the September 11, 2012 attacks, “…there were fragmentary reports from the IC indicating 
that more in-depth intelligence exploitation of social media in the Benghazi area, including 
web postings by Libyan nationals employed at the Temporary Mission Facility, could have 
flagged potential security threats to the Mission facility or important information about the 
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employees prior to the September 11, 2012 attacks.”119  The IC failed to utilize all resources 
available.  Considering the environment surrounding the U.S. Mission, intelligence leaders 
should have anticipated an attack (especially after the previous two attacks in April and June) 
and actively searched for related intelligence in every source available.  They should have 
been on an alert considering the nature of the extremist groups and their ill intent toward U.S. 
interests. 
All of these “excuses” do not justify the killings of Ambassador Stevens, Officer 
Smith, and Navy SEALS Doherty and Woods.  There was intelligence that was overlooked 
and/or not collected and poor decisions that were made (or lack thereof) by policymakers, all 
of which resulted in these four deaths.  The IC, to include its leaders, failed fully to 
understand and educate themselves about the extremist militias in Libya and the potential 
threats they pose to U.S. interests.120  These results reflect the importance of proper 
education, training, and experience.   
In all cases, there is always room for improvement as nothing is done perfectly, but in 
this particular case study, the need for improvement is imperative in order to prevent similar 
failures.  As previously stated, understanding the enemy and its capabilities was a significant 
part of the intelligence failure.  The IC and its leaders did not properly educate themselves of 
the enemy and missed out on valuable intelligence that could have prevented the September 
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11, 2012 Benghazi attacks.  Not only should the IC and its leaders educate themselves about 
the enemy, but they should also take the initiative to educate and train themselves for high-
threat situations, such as the events surrounding the Benghazi attacks.  The ARB suggests 
collaborating joint courses that integrate high-threat training and risk management decision 
processes through the Diplomatic Security Training Center and Foreign Service Institute, 
along with Foreign Affairs Counter Threat training, to improve their leadership abilities in 
such instances.121  Leaders should be prepared to handle any type of situation that is 
presented to them.  This includes situations that involve high risk and high threats.  Any 
activity surrounding the U.S. Mission should have been considered high risk and a high 
threat considering the ill intent of the extremist militias in Libya.  Senior policy and 
intelligence leaders should have recognized this and taken the proper precautionary measures 
to ensure the safety of all U.S. personnel. 
In this particular case study, a form of leadership previously addressed that would be 
ideal for this event would be the situational approach.  Since the environment in Benghazi 
was at high risk and unpredictable, leaders should have adapted to this environment and led 
their subordinates toward safety at all times.  Intelligence and policy leaders failed in this 
regard by not fulfilling the repeated requests for security made by U.S. personnel in 
Benghazi.  They ignored proper security measures and lives were put at risk because of their 
laziness and inability to prioritize these lives of their fellow Americans, as also mentioned in 
ARB report.  The ARB states, “Board members found a pervasive realization among 
personnel who served in Benghazi that the Special Mission was not a high priority for 
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Washington when it came to security-related requests, especially those relating to 
staffing.”122  
Lack of education, training, and experience led to four dead Americans.   Had the 
proper leaders taken the initiative to educate themselves about the enemy and the high-threat 
circumstances, and then sought the proper training to learn how to handle these threats, they 
would almost certainly have prevented these killings.   Those who had been more 
experienced would have recognized the need for further education and training in order to be 
successful in handling these matters.  The ARB reports that the staff assigned to the Special 
Mission in Benghazi were relatively inexperienced and consisted of personnel who worked 
temporary duty assignments, which ultimately resulted in “diminished institutional 
knowledge, continuity, and mission capacity.”123  Although intelligence failures are 
inevitable over the long term, those that occurred before the Benghazi attacks can definitely 
be avoided and prevented with proper leadership.  Leaders who fully commit themselves to a 
task strive to be competent.  They ensure they are properly educated and trained so they can 
achieve success and avoid failure.   
Pearl Harbor 
 The attack on Pearl Harbor is a moment that united Americans across the nation as 
we made our entrance into World War II.  Many Americans remember the raid as a 
“surprise” attack by the Japanese.  Some believe conspiracy theories that claim President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt had prior knowledge of the attack and needed a significant reason to 
gain America’s support for entering World War II (which lack credible evidence), while 
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others who have done the research, “view Pearl Harbor as the consequence of missed clues, 
intelligence errors, and overconfidence.”124   
On December 7, 1941, more than 2,400 American soldiers and sailors were killed and 
at least another 1,000 were wounded after hundreds of Japanese fighter planes attacked Pearl 
Harbor that morning.  Nearly 20 American naval vessels, to include eight battleships, and 
over 200 airplanes were destroyed.125  Fortunately, all of the aircraft carriers were away from 
the base and none was destroyed.  On December 8, 1941, Congress approved President 
Roosevelt’s declaration of war and the United States was now a part of World War II. 
Although most Americans remember the attack at Pearl Harbor as a “surprise” attack, 
the reality is that signs of the attack were presented to the IC and policymakers, but 
ultimately ignored for various reasons.  Prior to the attack, the relationship between the U.S. 
and Japan had deteriorated.  Policymakers were aware of the hostility between the U.S. and 
Japan, but underestimated Japan’s intentions and capabilities.  Although they were keeping a 
close eye on Japan, there were several warnings that were overlooked that would have 
allowed our government leaders to take preventative action against the Pearl Harbor attack. 
One of the most useful and promising intelligence collection methods that have been 
used, especially prior to the attacks of Pearl Harbor, is code breaking.  The U.S. Army and 
Navy were each assigned special sections of decoding Japanese communications.  This 
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operation that decoded Japanese codes and ciphers was known as MAGIC.126  Military and 
government officials had access to some of the “most private communications between the 
Japanese government and its ambassadors in Washington, Berlin, Rome, Berne, Ankara, and 
other Japanese embassies throughout the world.”127  They had the advantage of knowing, in 
advance, the diplomatic moves of Japan and what information Japan had on American 
defense preparedness.   
The U.S. Army and Navy cracked a variety of codes to include the top-priority code, 
PURPLE.  PURPLE was decoded by first finding the key, which depended on getting a 
certain amount of traffic in that key, and then decoded by a machine.128  There were four 
machines built with a fifth in production for Pearl Harbor.  These machines obtained 
information from Tokyo faster than the Japanese themselves.129  By late 1941, cryptanalysts 
were deciphering 50 to 75 messages a day.130  Although MAGIC was only discussed among 
a few government officials, Americans had a tremendous advantage over Japan, or so they 
thought.  One misconception about MAGIC was that our government and military officials 
were able to decode all messages, to include Japanese naval and military codes.  In actuality, 
we were only able to decode diplomatic and espionage messages; therefore, we were unable 
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to decode any strategic and tactical planning.  Simply relying on these decoded messages was 
a major contribution that led to the “sneak attack.”   
Although there were not any strategic messages exchanged between Japanese 
government officials and their ambassadors around the world, the IC did decode a couple of 
messages that contained talk of Pearl Harbor prior to the attack.  Unfortunately, they were 
obviously not given high priority, as they should have been. The first message occurred on 
September 24, 1941.  The message between Tokyo and the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu 
was intercepted that requested the consulate make reports to divide the waters of Pearl 
Harbor in five subareas.131  This message was translated by the U.S. Army on October 9, 
1941 and delivered by Commander A.D. Kramer.  Commander Kramer found the 
information to be interesting and highlighted its’ importance with: “Tokyo directs special 
reports on ships in Pearl Harbor which is divided into five areas for the purpose of showing 
exact locations.”132  According to the United States Congress Investigation, after the attack, 
the message was referred to as the “bomb plot message,” the “harbor berthing plan,” and 
other similar terms.133    
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There were three more intercepted messages that related to the September 24 message 
and made reference to Pearl Harbor prior to the attack.  On November 15, 1941, another 
message between Tokyo and the Honolulu Consulate was translated on December 3 stated 
“As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your ‘ships in 
harbor report’ irregular, but at a rate of twice a week.  Although you already are no doubt 
aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.”134  On November 20, a message 
intercepted that read, “Please investigate comprehensively the fleet – bases in the 
neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation.”  This message was translated on 
December 4, a day after the previous message.  The final message, intercepted on November 
29 and translated December 5 (the third consecutive day to identify messages relating to 
Pearl Harbor), a message read, “We have been receiving reports from you on ship 
movements, but in future will you also report even when there is no movements?”135  After 
three consecutive days of translating messages that addressed the American Fleet at Pearl 
Harbor, why did our IC fail to detect a pattern in those messages?  Would our IC not be 
sensitive to any information involving the United States, especially after consecutive 
warning?  Although there was not any specific indication of an attack, or more specifically, 
the exact timing of an attack, is that a sufficient reason to not take precautionary measures if 
there is some indication your homeland may be a target?  As General Walter Short stated 
after the attack in his testimony, “…they should certainly have let me know that the Japanese 
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were getting reports of the exact location of the ships in Pearl Harbor…because such details 
would be useful only for sabotage, or for air submarine attack in Hawaii.”136  
A major error that our intelligence and government leaders ultimately made was 
underestimating the enemy and becoming overconfident with the intelligence collected.  
Failure to recognize the possibility of an attack upon our own soil even though intelligence 
pointed directly to the attack is a reflection of poor leadership.  Intelligence and government 
officials were convinced Japan would be senseless by attacking the United States.  There was 
no doubt that the United States was more powerful strategically and as an army.  Japan 
strategically used this to their advantage and had a successful attack.  The United States 
ignored the unimaginable and, what they thought, was the impossible.   
The incredible efforts in decoding the Japanese diplomatic communications with their 
ambassadors around the world through MAGIC gave our nation a significant advantage over 
Japan, but also led to overconfidence in their judgment.  Although MAGIC only intercepted 
diplomatic communications, our intelligence analysts relied heavily on these daily 
interceptions and believed MAGIC would catch every vital piece of information.  This heavy 
reliance led to underestimating the capabilities of the Japanese and their intentions.137  
As discussed earlier, one of the major causes of an intelligence failure is when biases 
and opinions have an impact on decision making during any level of the intelligence process.  
It is common for an individual to form their belief on a particular matter and have that belief 
influence future decisions concerning the same matter.  New information that is inconsistent 
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with one’s beliefs is easily discarded, while information in agreement with one’s beliefs is 
taken into consideration during the analytical process.138   As Roberta Wohlstetter states, 
“There is tendency in our planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable.  The 
contingency we have not considered seriously looks strange; what looks strange is thought 
improbable; what is improbable need not be considered seriously.”139 Intelligence officers 
had convinced themselves that if Japan were going to attack anyone, they were going to 
attack Southeast Asia.  Therefore, since they strongly believed their perception to be the 
truth, any other intelligence not focused or directed toward an attack on Southeast Asia was 
mentally discarded.140  The leaders involved in this matter were convinced they had all the 
information they needed due to the success of MAGIC.  They felt in control of our relations 
with Japan and underestimated Japan’s capabilities.  Information that addressed Pearl Harbor 
as a potential target for an attack was not viewed as a threat and was not even considered for 
further investigation.141 Commander Kramer testified that he does “not believe it was 
interpreted by any of those persons as being materially different than other messages 
concerning ship movements being reported by the Japanese diplomatic service.”142  Although 
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he marked the message as an “interesting message,” his translation of the September 24th 
message was that it was similar to other messages intercepted through MAGIC and did not 
impose a threat to him or anyone else who read the message.  The ability to make effective 
and efficient decisions can be impaired once one becomes narrow minded and ignores new 
evidence or ideas.  Successful leaders keep an open mind to new ideas and perspectives and 
take all accounts of an event into consideration. 
After such a “surprise” attack as Pearl Harbor, there were obvious mistakes made that 
needed attention and evaluation in order to prevent a repeat in history.  The United States 
Congress conducted an investigation surrounding the facts of the attack in order to determine 
where the origin of the problem was and what can be done to help resolve the problem.  
There were several areas in the intelligence process that required special attention.  The first 
recommendation made was a recommendation that is still made today in order to improve our 
IC and the intelligence process – agency integration.  The investigation recommends “That 
there be a complete integration of Army and Navy intelligence agencies in order to avoid the 
pitfalls of divided responsibility which experience has made so abundantly apparent…”143  
The chances of an intelligence failure increase when agencies within the IC either refuse to 
share intelligence with one another, or are not educated on how and when to share 
intelligence.  Intelligence leaders must have the ability to recognize when and what 
intelligence should be shared among agencies.  This ability is developed through valuable 
experience and proper education and training.  They understand the importance of 
intelligence sharing and direct their priorities toward the best interests of this country.     
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As previously addressed, efficient and effective leaders are those who are able to put 
aside their own personal beliefs, among other things, and have the ability to consider all 
avenues of any given situation.  By doing so, they are able to have “greater imagination and a 
keener awareness of the significance of intelligence” that is collected.144  These abilities are 
usually developed through proper education, training, and experience.  Those who seek 
education on certain matters to expand their knowledge on the variety of possibilities and 
who seek specific training on how to handle the potential threats that may be involved are 
adequate leaders.  By expanding their knowledge on different matters, the leader is exposed 
to an array of information.  Without proper exposure, leaders have no choice but to rely on 
what they already know.  Leaders then become too comfortable with their own beliefs and 
fail to exercise their best decision-making skills   
Receiving the proper education on certain matters and learning how to handle them is 
equally important as familiarizing themselves of their own organization and subordinates. By 
doing so, leaders are able to adopt the most fitting leadership style and training techniques 
that can ultimately achieve success.  It is difficult to delegate effectively if a leader is not 
familiar with his or her people.  Good, competent leaders are those who are able to relate to 
their subordinates and, most importantly, relay the importance of proper execution within the 
intelligence process.  As the United States Congress Investigation states, “An official who 
neglects to familiarize himself in detail with his organization should forfeit his 
responsibility.”145  
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Discarded intelligence cost several Americans their lives and crippled our retaliatory 
powers for nearly six months.  Leaders became overconfident with their findings and were 
humbled when Japan caught our nation off guard and destroyed the U.S. Pacific Fleet at 
Pearl Harbor.  Although intelligence leaders were successful in breaking the Japanese code 
through MAGIC and were able to intercept communications between Japan and their 
ambassadors around the world, they failed at properly analyzing the intelligence produced by 
creating a tunnel vision of “acceptable” intelligence.  Intelligence leaders could have escaped 
this tunnel vision had they received the appropriate education and training of our relation 
issues with Japan.  We may not have been involved in World War II while we were 
collecting intelligence regarding Japan prior to the attack, but considering the aggression 
circumstances around the world, our leaders should have been more aware and considerate of 
potential threats involving our country. 
Cuban Missile Crisis 
Failures are usually more noticeable than achievements since failures require more 
attention and reform. However, there are multiple instances where intelligence has led a 
mission to success though - one of the most being the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Many 
Americans remember the Cuban Missile Crisis as an event that exemplified superb leadership 
within the IC and among policymakers.  Both entities worked together to diffuse the nuclear 
threat imposed by the Soviet Union in order to avoid a nuclear war that would affect those 
involved directly and indirectly.  These leaders took the time to educate themselves about the 
situation and the tactical abilities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the 
area.  They applied knowledge and expertise accumulated through training and experience 
toward the situation and worked diligently to ensure success. 
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After an embarrassing intelligence failure in attempting to overthrow the Castro 
regime in Cuba with the Bay of Pigs invasion, U.S. intelligence continued their interest in 
Cuba and discovered evidence that included a major Soviet arms build-up, including IL-28 
bombers, during routine surveillance flights.146  As a warning to Cuba, President Kenney 
issued a public statement advising Cuba against introducing offensive weapons while 
emphasizing U.S. military and nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union.147  Due to the failed 
Bay of Pigs invasion, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was convinced he could covertly 
place offensive missiles in Cuba.  After the missiles were in position in Cuba, Khrushchev 
decided that President Kennedy would not escalate the situation by insisting they be 
removed.  Khrushchev continued to assume President Kennedy’s lack of leadership and 
confidence and ignored any and all warnings against the USSR.148  
The IC and policymakers at this time had doubt about the utility of HUMINT and 
thus favored technical sources of intelligence such as vehicles, ships, aircraft, and satellites.  
Although they were favorable of these types of intelligence, they were reluctant to allow U-2 
flights over Cuban territory in fear of Soviet missiles shooting down the flights right before 
mid-term elections.  Fortunately, DCI John McCone challenged their reluctance and obtained 
President Kennedy’s approval to allow the U-2 flights over the interior of Cuba.149  Without 
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DCI McCone’s persistence, the nuclear missiles would have gone undiscovered and would 
have posed a huge threat to our national security.   
 DCI McCone was asked to assume his position in 1961 by President Kennedy 
himself.  Ironically, McCone did not have prior intelligence experience, but made an 
impression on President Kennedy with his profound leadership in the engineering and 
construction fields.  McCone graduated from the University of California, Berkeley with a 
degree in engineering.  He founded one of the leading U.S. shipbuilding companies during 
World War II after he graduated and earned the notice of government leaders with his 
leadership and production standards.150 President Harry S. Truman recruited McCone and 
appointed him to the Air Policy Commission in 1947 and further named him special deputy 
to the Secretary of Defense the following year.  Shortly after, McCone became the 
undersecretary of the Air Force in 1950, and then served as chairman to the Atomic Energy 
Commission under President Dwight Eisenhower until he assumed the position of DCI in 
1961.151  McCone’s technological expertise helped influence President Kennedy to approve 
the U-2 flights over Cuba.  The decision to allow the U-2 flights would lead directly to the 
biggest challenge of Kennedy’s presidency.  Not only did the approved U-2 flights discover 
Russian nuclear missiles in Cuba, but they also (indirectly) led to the death of United States 
Air Force (USAF) Major Rudolph Anderson, Jr. on October 27th, 1962, when his plane was 
shot down by an SA-2 surface- to air missile.  
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 It was McCone’s persistence that allowed the IC to identify the nuclear missiles the 
Soviets were attempting to hide in Cuba.  Although Soviet leaders advised Khrushchev 
against the idea, he decided to follow through and begin the importation of offensive missiles 
into Cuba.152  Khrushchev began importing Soviet military equipment and personnel by 
trying to claim they were importing agricultural supplies to Cuba.  Of course, that cover-up 
was hard to believe, but no one believed the Soviets would be importing military equipment 
until the IC detected SA-2 SAM (Soviet surface-to-air missiles) sites in early August 1962.  
This detection raised a flag with DCI McCone and immediately after the detection, he gave 
several warnings to President Kennedy that he believed the Soviets were intending to place 
offensive missiles in Cuba.153  McCone attended meetings in August 1962 with several of 
President Kennedy’s advisors and voiced his thoughts regarding Soviet intentions.  McCone 
used deductive reasoning to come to his conclusion, but was still unable to convince the 
Kennedy Administration (the same individuals who were fearful of flying U-2 flights over 
Cuba) of the potential offensive missiles in Cuba.   
 McCone continued to press his strong opinions about the Soviet’s intentions in Cuba 
for the next couple of months.  While McCone was on his honeymoon in France after getting 
married in September, he learned that there had not been U-2 flights ordered to fly over Cuba 
during the time he was out of the country.  There was very little information that had been 
obtained about Cuba’s interior.154  Since no one had ordered U-2 flights to monitor the 
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activity in Cuba for over a month, McCone was unable to make a definitive statement that 
there were not any offensive missiles in Cuba.  A lack of intelligence does not equate to 
intelligence itself, but rather indicates lack of information.  Although the September Special 
National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) underestimated the Soviet’s capabilities of producing 
and storing offensive missiles in Cuba, McCone decided to address the President with his 
concerns and propositions.155  President Kennedy’s advisors remained adamantly against 
over-flights and insisted on flying peripheral missions. McCone countered their proposals by 
showing that peripheral missions could not confirm nor deny the presence of offensive 
missiles.  He proposed sending a number of short flights over Cuba that would scan the entire 
island.  The COMOR (Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance) and President Kennedy 
approved his proposal and ordered four (4) U-2 flights to fly over Cuba on October 14th.  
This mission, insisted upon by DCI McCone, was the first to discover the installation of 
Soviet offensive missiles.156  
On October 14, 1962, Pilot Major Richard Heyser crossed into Cuba territory in an 
American U-2 spy plane and took 928 pictures, in six minutes, of nuclear missiles located in 
Cuba.157  After submitting the photos to the Naval Photographic Interpretation Center at 
Suitland, Maryland, it was discovered the Soviet Union was behind the construction of 
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surface-to-surface nuclear missiles.  On the morning of October 16, 1962, President Kennedy 
and his principal advisors were informed of the evidence, confirming DCI McCone’s 
judgment, and began to deliberate over the matter and consider what actions needed to be 
taken.  The deliberation lasted for five days while President Kennedy and his advisors 
considered possible outcomes to an array of decisions.    
They all knew that a decision had to be made quickly to stop the construction of 
nuclear missiles; it was just a matter of deciding which action would have a lesser 
consequence.  The President and his advisors were aware that any action chosen could 
possibly lead to a bigger crisis.  As stated in the CIA Library, “Even if events stopped a long 
way short of the cataclysm, there was still room for a thundering crisis, the outcome of which 
would depend in significant measure upon the way in which our allies would respond—
whether they would support us or back away.”158  The President needed to terminate and 
remove the Soviet Union’s construction all while attempting to avoid a nuclear war. 
 The President and his advisors contemplated their decisions in secret meetings up 
until they were ready to brief the public on the matter.  Eight (8) days after Major Heyser 
snapped photos of the nuclear missiles being constructed by the Soviet Union in Cuba, 
President Kennedy made the decision to address American citizens and inform them of the 
situation along with the possible outcomes that may result after action has been taken. The 
decision was made to quarantine Cuban imports of all offensive military equipment.  This 
was just the first step in taking action to remove the missiles from Cuba.  President Kennedy 
presented the operation to the public with careful consideration by using the word 
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“quarantine” specifically to avoid any verbiage that could or would trigger a war with the 
Soviet Union.  The President was aware that using the term “blockade” might lead to a war, 
since placing a blockade can be construed an act of war.  His decision to force the removal of 
the missiles would upset the Soviet Union, but his plan of action was to successfully remove 
the missiles without starting a war.159  
 President Kennedy’s decision to quarantine all offensive military equipment 
effectively resulted in a ring of ships around Cuba.  Specifically, the purpose of the 
quarantine was to prevent the Soviets from importing additional military supplies. Although 
President Kennedy and his advisors knew the Soviet Union would be upset with the 
quarantine, no one was able to predict how Khrushchev would react. The objective of the 
operation was to communicate a political message from President Kennedy to Khrushchev.160 
President Kennedy took great caution in his decisions in order to avoid upsetting 
Khrushchev.  He was careful not to provoke Khrushchev into war, but was fully prepared to 
invade Cuba.   
On October 28, 1962, Khrushchev publicly agreed to remove the nuclear missiles in 
return for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba.161  According to the JFK Library, “…the leaders 
of both superpowers recognized the devastating possibility of a nuclear war and publicly 
agreed to a deal in which the Soviets would dismantle the weapon sites in exchange for a 
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pledge from the United States not to invade Cuba.”162  President Kennedy was able 
successfully to address the issue presented through intelligence all while avoiding what could 
have been a disastrous war. 
 Policymakers were insistent upon making the “safe” decision instead of taking the 
required risks to collect appropriate intelligence.  Without McCone’s persistence, failure to 
take the necessary measures to confirm or deny offensive missiles in Cuba could have led to 
a much bigger national security issue than the repercussions of a downed U-2 flight.  Good, 
competent leaders consider all consequences to all decisions and prioritize these 
consequences.  They do not allow predetermined mindsets to control evidence of an 
adversary’s probable or ongoing actions.  Policymakers were reluctant to confirm or deny 
whether the Soviets stored offensive missiles in Cuba.  They were opposed to taking the risk, 
even though our national security would be at a higher risk if nuclear weapons were detected.  
Instead, they were fearful of U-2 flights being shot down.  Comparatively, running the risk 
posed by U-2 flights being shot down was far less than risking the possibility of offensive 
missiles in Cuba.  Leaders must decide “how much risk is worth taking to gain the 
information needed to make wise policy in dangerous situations.”163  DCI McCone 
recognized the potential dangers in ignoring potential offensive missiles in Cuba and took the 
initiative to prove the existence or non-existence of such missiles.    
 McCone, aware of his responsibilities as an intelligence leader, initially remained 
open-minded to any and all possibilities relating to the Soviets and Cuba.  He stated that the 
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position he took was based on a judgment factor.  Intelligence analysts deal with facts in the 
analytical process whereas intelligence leaders deal with intuition and judgment.164   
McCone’s experience in the business field allowed him to make a reasonable judgment 
regarding the situation and use inferences and deductive reasoning to support his judgment. 
He alone among President Kennedy’s staff believed that the Soviets were importing nuclear 
missiles into Cuba.  If he had any amount of doubt in his position and abilities as a leader, he 
would not have persisted in his stance.  McCone educated himself on what the Soviets were 
capable of and understood that they were the enemy, not a friend, and that the bigger risk 
would be to make decisions based on their statements, rather than their actions.165   
 The leadership exhibited during this crisis was profound and exemplary.  Both 
President Kennedy and DCI McCone utilized their knowledge of Russia and intuition 
regarding its true intentions to make sound decisions toward our national security.  Kennedy 
admired McCone’s persistence and his role as DCI.  The admiration was mutual as McCone 
commended President Kennedy’s handling of the crisis.166   They were both determined to 
identify the problem and make rational decisions to protect our nation and avoid a nuclear 
war.  McCone was determined to find out what the Soviets were up to in Cuba and once the 
missiles were detected, Kennedy was determined that they would not be a threat to the U.S.  
Kennedy used strategic methods to ensure he did not provoke a war with the Soviets.  He was 
careful to devise a quarantine rather than a blockade because the latter would have been an 
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act of war.167  As McCone stated, “It was an indication of his cautious but determined 
approach.”168  Both leaders used the situational approach and adapted their leadership skills 
to the crisis.  This style of leadership was used due to the complexity and diversity of issues 
that arose.  They were each cautious with their decisions toward the crisis to ensure bigger 
issues were avoided that could have a greater impact on our national security.  Both leaders 
executed this style of leadership efficiently and effectively and successfully avoided what 
could have been a nuclear war.   
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CHAPTER IV  
CONCLUSION 
 As shown in this study, continuous education, training, and experience can greatly 
affect the outcome of a mission and/or situation.  These components combined with the 
qualities and traits of a leader minimize the chance for failure while ensuring our national 
security needs are met.  It is vital that intelligence leaders establish a strong leadership 
foundation by focusing constantly on these key elements - education, training and 
experience.  They are able to further the development of their skills through different sources 
of education and training.  Leaders who do not pursue any of these key elements are more 
likely to produce intelligence failures that can potentially compromise our national security.    
 The case studies addressed in the previous chapter illustrate how the lack of 
education, training, and experience can lead to an intelligence failure and result in bigger 
consequences, such as taking the lives of innocent individuals.  One common mistake made 
by intelligence leaders that has led to failure, as seen in the 2012 Benghazi attack and Pearl 
Harbor case studies, is a lack of education regarding the enemy and its capabilities.  Leaders 
fail to take the time and effort to educate themselves about the enemy, which is a vital part to 
countering their threats and offensive actions. The Pearl Harbor attack is a primary example 
of this failure.  In this case, the warnings of the attack were evident, but were ignored by the 
IC because they dismissed the idea of Japan being capable of attacking the U.S.  This 
underestimation cost the lives of thousands of innocent individuals and had a detrimental 
impact on our nation.  By having a better understanding of our enemies’ capabilities, leaders 
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are able to direct their training toward specific subject matters or areas of improvement to 
meet the needs of the mission at task.   
 Chapter II of this study identifies several sources of training and education that are 
available to intelligence leaders.  There are academic institutions available to these leaders 
along with trainings offered by Federal government agencies such as OPM, OGE, and DoD.  
There are also several training opportunities that are available that meet the specific needs of 
a mission and/or to counter a threat imposed upon our nation.  In order to become a better 
leader, he or she must take the initiative to seek the proper education and training to help 
maximize his or her abilities and skills.  As mentioned in Chapter 2, the education and 
training received will not substitute the quality of valuable professional experience.  
Experience develops qualities in a leader that cannot be developed through a training 
program or academic class.  DCI McCone’s position in the Cuban Missile Crisis, as 
discussed in Chapter III, is an excellent example of the value of experience.  Although he did 
not have prior intelligence experience, he developed critical qualities as a leader, such as 
character and intuition, through his experience as a business professional in the engineering 
field.  His profound display of these qualities earned him leadership positions within different 
presidential administrations.  His character allowed him to remain unbiased and eliminate 
any pre-determined mindsets surrounding him during the crisis.  His intuition was a major 
factor in his deductive reasoning toward the judgment he made regarding the offensives 
missiles in Cuba.  Without his persistency and strong leadership skills, the nuclear missiles 
could have gone unnoticed and had a detrimental impact upon our nation. 
 These and other vital qualities of a leader are addressed in Chapter I.  This chapter 
sets forth the foundational attributes of an intelligence leader and the duties with which he or 
	  
	   69	  
she is entrusted.  It also describes the intelligence process and the relationship between 
policymakers and the IC.  This relationship is displayed in all three case studies discussed in 
the previous chapter.  Weak policy-intelligence relationships increase the chances of failure 
whereas a strong relationship has potential to lead to a successful outcome.  By comparing 
the case studies presented in this study, it is evident that the relationship between DCI 
McCone and President Kennedy is one of the critical things that led to a successful resolution 
of the Cuban Missile Crisis.  The uncertainty between the IC and policymakers displayed in 
the 2012 Benghazi Attacks study contributed to the intelligence failure.  The IC appeared to 
understand the capabilities of the Islamic extremist groups, but it failed to communicate this 
understanding to policymakers.  By simply opening a line of communication between the IC 
and policymakers, this failure could have been prevented.  Lack of knowledge in a variety of 
policy and intelligence arenas can lead to uncertainty.  This can either be a result of 
ignorance or just a lack of communication.  A unified effort between the IC and 
policymakers will not only increase our chances of success, but also relieve additional 
stresses that accompany discord. 
 One major part of a leader’s position that can help achieve his or her success is the 
style of leadership that is practiced.  There are leaders who make their decisions based on the 
situation presented to them, while there are leaders who are evaluated and judged for quality 
through their actions. There are also leaders who focus on transforming other into leaders 
themselves.  Some leaders achieve more success by delegating and earning respect from their 
subordinates.  Other leaders prefer to work with their subordinates to establish a strong, 
working relationship in order to become successful.  It is not the style of leadership that 
defines a leader; rather it is how that style is executed.  The different styles of leadership 
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discussed in Chapter I can be more effective with a solid foundation of the key elements 
addressed in this study. 
 These key elements are necessary to developing good, competent leaders in our IC.  
Leaders who further their education, training, and experience have a better chance of 
achieving success.  While it is recommended that leaders should take the initiative to seek 
these elements and strive to be better leaders, it would be beneficial for agencies to mandate 
certain training programs and classes either as a basic foundation or on a case-by-case basis 
(depending on the circumstances surrounding our national security at the time).  It is difficult 
to think of any negative consequences to imposing these key elements considering they are 
used as development tools.  They will only work to improve our intelligence leaders, which 
ultimately improves our efforts to maintain our national security. 
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APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS 
 
 
AFCEA – Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association 
ARB – Accountability Review Board 
CDSE – The Center for Development of Security Excellence 
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency 
COMOR – Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance 
DAEO – Designated Agency Ethics Official 
DCI – Director Central Intelligence 
DIA – Defense Intelligence Agency 
DNI – Director of National Intelligence 
DoD – Department of Defense 
DSE – Defense Security Enterprise 
DSS – Defense Security Service 
FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigations 
FedLDP – Federal Leadership Development Programs 
HSC – Homeland Security Council 
IC – Intelligence Community 
ICD – Intelligence Community Directive 
IFF – identification friend or foe 
IRTPA – Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
IWP – The Institute of World Politics 
JBAB – Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling 
JMITC – Joint Military Intelligence Training Center 
LIS – Libyan Intelligence Service 
NCIX – National Counterintelligence Executive aka Director of National Counterintelligence 
NIC – National Intelligence Council 
NIU – National Intelligence University 
NSC – National Security Council 
ODNI – Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
OGE – United States Office of Government Ethics 
OIG – Office of the Inspector General 
OPM – Office of Personnel Management 
RSO – Regional Security Officer 
SNIE – Special National Intelligence Estimate 
TNC – Transitional National Council 
TS/SCI – Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmentalized Information 
USAF – United States Air Force 
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction 
       
  
 
